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I. IN THE WAKE OF CORPORATE SCANDAL
The "irrational exuberance"' of the late 1990s, marked by
frenzied stock trading and risky investment strategies, 2 fueled
aggressive accounting practices that exaggerated real achievements
and camouflaged setbacks. 3 During that time, investors accepted
business practices that measured performance by revenue, rather
than earnings or cash, and by the number of "eyeballs hitting Internet
sites." 4  According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan,
"when greed swept through our nation, we were not prepared to
address it." 5 The result was accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom
and other organizations, in which directors failed to ask "questions of
management to determine whether the stock was rising solely as a
result of smoke and mirrors."6 In 2002, Congress responded to these
scandals with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which modified governance,
reporting and disclosure rules for public companies. 7
Beyond the federal legislative response, these corporate
scandals occasioned a new judicial and regulatory focus on directors'
good faith performance of their corporate responsibilities. This trend
has been evident in recent state and federal court decisions addressing
directors' fiduciary duty of good faith and the business judgment rule.8
Most notably, in the 2003 decision In re The Walt Disney Co.
1. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan coined this term in a speech in late 1996.
Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and Risk in Securities
Law, 64 U. PiTT. L. REV. 483, 483 n.5 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923 (2003).
4. Id. at 927.
5. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457 (2004) (citation
omitted).
6. E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron WorldCom
Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 840 (2003). Such was the case according to the
Thornburgh Report on WorldCom, which revealed that WorldCom's directors allowed the senior
officers to manage to the market instead of a solid, strategic business plan that the directors
developed and monitored. Id. The Powers Report on Enron differed, but also pointed to
fundamental flaws in corporate governance. Id.
7. Cunningham, supra note 3, at 941.
8. The business judgment rule is a corporate director's strongest defense against
shareholder lawsuits. See John Gibeaut, Stock Responses, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2003, at 38 (stating
that the business judgment rule is a "venerable bludgeon that has whacked countless...
derivative lawsuits").
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Derivative Litigation, a Delaware chancery court declined to apply the
business judgment rule in a derivative action where the court found
that the company's directors failed to exercise any judgment in their
decision making.9 According to one commentator, the court's decision
raised concerns among many corporate directors about their own
personal liability when making decisions on behalf of their
corporations, and "serves as a warning to corporate directors that
state courts are now willing to allow plaintiffs to prove that directors
who fail to exercise due care in carrying out their fiduciary duties
should be liable to the shareholders of the corporation, even without
the suggestion of self-dealing." 10 The Disney case seems to have been
well-received by the Delaware Supreme Court,11 suggesting that this
approach will influence other jurisdictions. 12
In the regulatory context, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has recently displayed a "willingness to pursue
cases against outside directors who [are] reckless in their oversight of
management and asleep at the switch.... ."13 Specifically, in SEC v.
Adley, the SEC brought its first charges ever against an outside
director who allowed securities fraud to occur under his watch.14 The
Adley action may signal a new regulatory emphasis on directors' good
faith performance of their duties and, as a result, directors may face
increased liability exposure.
Corporate directors' concern for the continued viability of the
business judgment rule1 5  underscores the importance of
understanding the current status of the law. Part II of this Note
surveys the development of directors' fiduciary duties and the
business judgment rule in Delaware and details the SEC's initiative
9. 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
10. Gary W. Marsh, The Many Faces of Directors' Fiduciary Duties, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Sept. 2003, at 54.
11. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 295, 2003 WL 23019210, at *1 (Del. Dec. 23, 2003)
(citing language from Disney when discussing questions about directors' good faith).
12. The Delaware Supreme Court is frequently followed by other state courts in the area of
corporate law. WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 1.17 (7th ed. 2004).
13. Otis Bilodeau, SEC to Go After Directors Who Ignore Fraud, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 21,
2003, at 51 (quoting SEC enforcement chief Stephen Cutler).
14. See SEC Sues Former Top Officers, Directors and Auditors of Chancellor Corporation
for Financial Fraud, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1763, 80 S.E.C. Docket
130, 130-31 (Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Sues Former Top Officers] (charging an outside
director with securities fraud for "ignoring clear warnings signs that financial improprieties were
ongoing at the company" and for "failing to ensure that the company's public filings were
accurate").
15. See Marsh, supra note 10, at 14 (stating that "[w]ith the increased number of derivative
actions against directors for breach of fiduciary duty, corporate directors now realize that the
business judgment rule no longer stands as an impenetrable shield against personal liability").
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targeting directors. Part III gauges the extent to which recent case
law and regulatory action signal a change in the application of the
business judgment rule or signal expanded regulatory liability for
directors. Part IV provides practical guidance to corporate
practitioners, who may counsel outside directors, about procedural
failures that may expose directors to liability and steps those directors
can take to minimize their exposure. Part V considers the policy
implications of stricter directorial liability and offers suggestions for
courts and the SEC to proceed in this area.
II. BACKGROUND ON DIRECTORS' LIABILITY: CASE LAW AND
REGULATORY ACTION
A. Delaware's Business Judgment Rule
In the Disney case, the central issue was whether to apply the
business judgment rule to the board of directors. 16 Under Delaware
law, the business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a
business decision, corporate directors "acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief' that their action was in the best
interests of the corporation. 17 Thus, directors' decisions are protected
from judicial second-guessing "unless the directors are interested or
lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act
in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose,
or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the
failure to consider all material facts reasonably available."18
This rule rests upon assumptions that "[managers and
directors possess] skills, information and judgment not possessed by
reviewing courts" and that "there is great social utility in encouraging
the allocation of assets and the evaluation and assumption of economic
risk by those with such skill and information ... ."19 The business
judgment rule gives directors considerable freedom to make decisions
16. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 285-86 (Del. Ch. 2003).
17. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), partially overruled by Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 253-54 (Del. 2000) (noting that Aronson "suggest[s] this Court will review under a
deferential abuse of discretion standard a decision of the Court of Chancery on a Rule 23.1
motion to dismiss a derivative suit" but finding that "our scope of review must be de novd', and
as a result, "[t]o the extent that Aronson and its progeny contain dicta expressing or suggesting
an abuse of discretion scope of review, that language is overruled.").
18. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66.
19. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) (citations
omitted).
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without fear of personal liability, but the rule is not absolute and
understanding its exceptions is crucial to applying the rule properly. 20
1. The Triad of Fiduciary Duties
The Delaware Supreme Court recognizes three distinct
fiduciary duties owed by corporate directors: care, loyalty, and good
faith.2' Traditionally, the duties of care and loyalty received more
attention from courts and academics than the duty of good faith.22 In
fact, at least one Delaware jurist doubts whether the duty of good
faith exists separate and apart from the duty of loyalty. 23 In Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, however, Delaware explicitly recognized good faith
as a distinct and equally important part of the "triad" of directors'
fiduciary duties. 24  This distinction is important because a
freestanding duty of good faith can apply to situations that do not
implicate a director's duty of loyalty.25
2. Breach of the Duty of Good Faith
Delaware case law gives various formulations to the good faith
requirement in the business judgment rule,26 but the general effect is
to allow a court to "review the substance of a business decision made
by an apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of
assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the bounds of
reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any
ground other than bad faith."27  In Parnes v. Bally Entertainment
Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court allowed shareholders to proceed
with a class action challenging the good faith of the board of directors'
20. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 2:10 (2003).
21. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001).
22. Sale, supra note 5, at 463.
23. See id. at 463-64 (quoting then-Vice-Chancellor Jacobs that "[good faith] is a subset or
'subsidiary requirement' that is subsumed within the duty of loyalty, as distinguished from being
a compartmentally distinct fiduciary duty of equal dignity with the two bedrock fiduciary duties
of loyalty and due care").
24. See Berlin, 787 A.2d at 90 (stating that these fiduciary duties "do not operate
intermittently" and the board of directors must "discharge each of their three primary fiduciary
duties at all times").
25. Sale, supra note 5, at 464.
26. "This 'escape hatch' language has been variously stated in the Delaware opinions:
egregious' decisions are said to be beyond the protections of the business judgment rule, as are
decisions that cannot 'be attributed to any rational business purpose,' or decisions that constitute
'a gross abuse of discretion.' " In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781 n.5
(Del. Ch. 1988) (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 780-81.
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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
approval of a merger.28 In that case, the company's CEO allegedly
conditioned his approval of the merger upon his receipt of bribes from
any would-be acquirors. 29 For their part, the company's directors
allegedly breached their fiduciary duties by "acquiescing in [the
CEO's] self-interested negotiations and by approving a merger at an
unfair price."30 The court concluded that the complaint alleged facts
that were "inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith."31 If, as
the shareholders claimed, the CEO negotiated the merger by
demanding a bribe, then it was "inexplicable that independent
directors, acting in good faith, could approve the deal."32 Parnes shows
that, in practice as well as in theory, irrationality may support a
finding of bad faith without additional evidence of self-dealing or a
lack of due care.
The Delaware Supreme Court has stated clearly that the good
faith requirement does not allow for the substantive review of
directors' decisions short of a determination of irrationality.33
According to the court in Brehm v. Eisner, "[c]ourts do not measure,
weigh or quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they
are reasonable in this context."34 Yet, there is perhaps a fine line
between reviewing the rationality of a director's decision and
reviewing its substance. In Gimbel v. Signal Companies, a court of
chancery considered a shareholder's challenge to a company's sale of
assets, where the shareholder sought an injunction against the
transaction based on the inadequacy of the sale price.35 The court
afforded the company's directors a presumption of good faith,36 but
stated that the plaintiff might dispel the protections of the business
judgment rule by proving that "price fixed for the sale of [the
28. 722 A.2d 1243, 1246-47 (Del. 1999).
29. Id. at 1245-46.
30. Id. at 1246.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1247.
33. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("[Substantive due care is] a concept
foreign to the business judgment rule."). Delaware's Chancellor Allen has stated:
"[Whether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or
'irrational', provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that
the process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance
corporate interests."
In re Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
34. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
35. 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974).
36. Id.
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GOOD FAITH IN THE POST-ENRON ERA
company's] assets was so clearly inadequate as constructively to carry
the badge of fraud."37
The Gimbel court arguably reviewed the substance of the
directors' sale price, despite the lack of evidence suggesting self-
dealing 38 or failure to exercise due care. 39 According to the court, "the
ultimate question is not one of method but one of value" and "a dollar
result which appears perhaps to be shocking is significant."40  This
language illustrates that while there may be no "substantive due care"
concept in the business judgment rule,41 there are substantive limits
to what a court will view as a good faith decision.
In evaluating good faith, the irrationality standard also
contemplates some degree of procedural review of directorial decision
making. In 1997's Scattered Corporation v. Chicago Stock Exchange,
Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court considered various procedural steps
in its good faith analysis. 42 The case involved a derivative suit by
members of the Chicago Stock Exchange alleging that officers and
directors of the Exchange had approved or at least passively permitted
systemic corruption.43 At issue in the case was the board of directors'
decision not to act on the plaintiffs' pre-suit demand. 44 According to
the court, in assessing whether the directors wrongfully refused the
plaintiffs demand, the court looks only to good faith and the
reasonableness of the directors' investigation. 45  The court then
considered the chancery court's analysis of the good faith and
reasonableness of the directors' investigation, which focused on
procedure. 46 On the basis of what it found to be adequate process, the
37. Id. at 609 (quoting Marks v. Wolfson, 188 A.2d 680, 685 (Del. Ch. 1963)) (internal
quotations omitted).
38. Id. at 610 ("Mhe Court can find no indication of self-dealing on the part of the Board of
Directors such as would taint the proposed transaction or neutralize the effect of the business
judgment rule.").
39. Id. at 615 ("When considered in light of the whole case, [the facts] do not in themselves
justify the conclusion that the 'directors acted so far without information that they can be said to
have passed an unintelligent and unadvised judgment.'" (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-W. Glass
Co., 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933))).
40. Id.
41. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
42. 701 A.2d 70, 76-77 (Del. 1997).
43. Id. at 71.
44. Id. at 72, 74-77.
45. Id. at 75.
46. Id. at 76. Specifically, the Court of Chancery looked at:
(a) the creation of [a] Special Committee; (b) the fact that it interviewed 25 people as well
as other people the plaintiffs had suggested would corroborate their claims of wrongful
conduct; (c) the findings by the Special Committee that claims made in the demand were
unsubstantiated; and (d) the conclusion by the Executive Committee, after 'careful
20051
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chancery court held that "the [directors'] decision was the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment."47 The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the chancery court's decision under these facts. 48
The Scattered Corp. decision illustrates that the good faith
standard can include procedural review. 49 This approach makes sense
intuitively. If directors' bad faith may be indicated by irrationality, 50
then one might reasonably expect a court to consider whether
directors followed some type of rational decision-making process in
arriving at a challenged decision. For example, one might imagine a
decision-making process so inadequate (e.g., totally lacking any effort
to investigate or consider the issue) that no reasonable person could
conclude that the directors acted in good faith. Although Scattered
Corp. did not involve such an extreme example, the subsequent Disney
decision shows that such poor decision making does not exist only in
the abstract.51  For a more comprehensive understanding of the
modern interplay between the duty of good faith and procedural
review, it is necessary to review the duty of care.
3. Breach of the Duty of Care
Procedural review is the central focus of the duty of care
analysis. The duty requires directors to act on an informed basis. 52 In
modern jurisprudence, the duty of care is integral to the application of
the business judgment rule, but that has not always been the case.5 3
At one time, courts were reluctant to hold directors liable for
uninformed decisions, absent some indication of self-dealing, bad
faith, or illegality.54 The Delaware Supreme Court's landmark 1985
consideration' of the Special Committee's investigation, that there is no basis on which it
could or should take action with respect to plaintiffs' allegations.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
47. Id. (quoting from Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., No. 14010, 1996 WL 417507,
at *5 (Del. Ch. July 12, 1996).
48. Id. at 77.
49. Sale, supra note 5, at 471 ("[Scattered Corp.] thus indicates that good faith applies to
decisionmaking processes, not just loyalty issues.").
50. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
51. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
52. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993). "The determination of
whether a business judgment is an informed one turns on whether the directors have informed
themselves 'prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available
to them.'" Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
53. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 20, § 2:11.
54. Id.; see also Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 592-94
(1983) (footnote omitted):
638 [Vol. 58:2:631
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decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, which held directors liable for an
uninformed decision even without self-dealing or bad faith, gave new
significance to the duty of care. 55 In fact, Van Gorkom precipitated a
swift legislative response which amended the Delaware General
Corporation Law "to allow for an optional charter provision to
exculpate directors for violations of the duty of due care."56  These
now-common exculpatory provisions have tempered the practical
effect of the duty of care; as one commentator observed, "[t]oday, the
duty of care serves as only a very weak constraint on director conduct
and is spoken of in unusually shrunken terms."57 Yet duty of care
procedural standards reemerged in post-Enron cases like Disney as a
means of holding directors liable.
Unlike most states, Delaware has not enacted a statute to
specify the degree of care required from a corporate director,58 but the
Delaware Supreme Court stated in 1963's Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co. that "directors of a corporation in managing the
corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances."59 A court will not find a board of directors to have
breached its duty of care unless the directors failed to inform
themselves fully and in a deliberate manner before voting on a
significant transaction.60
The Graham decision also addressed a director's duty to
monitor company employees for signs of wrongdoing. In that case, a
shareholder derivative action to recover damages for antitrust
violations, 61 the court considered the defendant directors' failure to
"[T]he principal detriment to shareholder litigation is the nearly universal judicial
reluctance to apply diligence standards against well-intentioned, non-self-enriching
directors and officers ....
Judicial retreat into the presumptive arena of the business judgment rule creates
considerable doubt that there remains a viable shareholder action in areas other than
fraud, conflict of interest, disloyalty, or the disclosure concerns of the securities
laws.... It is doubtful whether there still exists a sanction for lack of care,
unadulterated by self-enrichment or other opprobrious behavior."
55. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893; BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 20, § 2:11.
56. Sale, supra note 5, at 466.
57. Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 28 (2003).
58. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 20, § 2:4.
59. 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
60. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993). If the court finds that a
board of directors breached its duty of care, the board "lose[s] the protection of the business
judgment rule" and the court must "scrutinize the challenged transaction under an entire
fairness standard of review." Id.
61. The indictments against the Allis-Chalmers company and its four non-director
defendants alleged that the company and the defendants "conspired with other manufacturers
2005] 639
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maintain internal control systems. 62 The plaintiffs claimed that the
directors were liable by reason of their failure to take action designed
to learn of and prevent antitrust activity by any company employee. 63
The court concluded that "absent cause for suspicion there is no duty
upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of
espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to
suspect exists."64 The court addressed in dicta the circumstances in
which a director could be personally liable for losses incurred by a
corporation due to neglect, 65 but determined that the directors could
not be liable where, as soon as the misconduct became evident, the
board acted promptly to end it and prevent its recurrence. 66
The Graham decision's "reasonable director" standard gave
guidance to directors about Delaware courts' expectations for them,
but uncertainties remained as to the degree of negligence that would
result in a breach of the duty of-care. 68 In 1984's Aronson v. Lewis, the
Delaware Supreme Court considered the standard of care for
corporate directors in informing themselves of reasonably available
material information prior to decision making. 69 Although Delaware
case law was imprecise in "articulating the standard by which the
exercise of business judgment is governed," the court concluded that
director liability requires gross negligence. 70 In addition, the court
noted that "the business judgment rule operates only in the context of
and their employees to fix prices and to rig bids to private electric utilities and governmental
agencies in violation of the anti-trust laws of the United States." Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 188 A.2d 125, 127-28 (Del. 1963).
62. Id. at 130-31.
63. Id. at 127.
64. Id. at 130.
65. See id. ("If he has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy
employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored
either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will
cast the burden of liability upon him.").
66. Id. In this case, the directors had reason to suspect antitrust violations in November
1959, when some of the company's employees were subpoenaed before a grand jury. Id. at 128.
In February 1960, the directors commenced a series of meetings with employees, "[tlhe purpose
and effect of [which] was to eliminate any possibility of further and future violations of the anti-
trust laws." Id. at 129.
68. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) ("[T]he Delaware cases have not
been precise in articulating the standard by which the exercise of business judgment is
governed .. "), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see infra Part
II.A.4.
69. Id. at 812.
70. Id.; see supra note 69.
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director action."71  Where directors have either abdicated their
functions or failed to act without making a conscious decision, the
business judgment rule is inapplicable. 72
In 1985's Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court
refused to apply the business judgment rule where the defendant
directors failed to reach an informed business judgment in voting to
sell their company in a cash-out merger. 73 After just a two-hour
meeting, the directors approved the merger agreement based solely
upon a twenty-minute presentation by the CEO, supporting
representations by the company's officers and an attorney, and their
own knowledge of "the market history of the company's stock."74 The
directors did not discover the methodology used by the CEO to value
the company, and it was unclear whether they were given an
opportunity to study the merger agreement before voting on it. 75
Under these circumstances, the court found that the directors did not
reach an informed business judgment in voting to sell the company's
shares. 76 According to the court, the business judgment rule offers no
protection to directors who make "unintelligent or unadvised
judgment[s] ."77
The court also distinguished the duty of care and duty of
loyalty components of the business judgment rule, stating that the
"duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a
duty care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty."78 This language
gave notice that the court was prepared to enforce directors' duty of
care as a distinct element of the business judgment rule and that
liability was not predicated upon an accompanying finding of self-
dealing or bad faith. As the court stated, "fulfillment of the fiduciary
function requires more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud."79
As mentioned previously, the legislature amended the
Delaware General Corporation Law immediately after Van Gorkom to
71. Id. at 813.
72. Id. "[A] conscious decision to refrain from acting" may be protected by the business
judgment rule. Id.
73. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
74. Id. at 869.
75. Id. at 868 n.7.
76. Id. at 874. Specifically, "the directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to
[the CEO's] role in forcing the 'sale' of the [c]ompany and in establishing the per share purchase
price; (2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the [clompany"; and therefore (3) were, "at
a minimum .... grossly negligent in approving the 'sale' of the [c]ompany [after cursory
consideration,] without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency." Id.
77. Id. at 872 (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, 167 A. 831, 833 (1933)).
78. Id. at 872-73.
79. Id. at 872.
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allow exculpatory charter provisions for violations of the duty of
care.80 The amendment allowed directors to propose that such a
charter provision be added or removed.81 Shareholders have the final
say on the proposal, but once an exculpatory provision is in place, it
cannot be removed unless the board of directors chooses to put the
issue back on the ballot.8 2 The Delaware judiciary has limited the
reach of these exculpatory provisions by holding that the provisions
apply as affirmative defenses only to due care allegations that are not
intertwined with other alleged fiduciary breaches, such as those
involving good faith.8 3 This limitation was particularly important in
Disney and other later cases that explored the relationship between
good faith and procedure.8 4
More than thirty years after the Graham decision, Delaware
jurisprudence revisited the question of whether directors could be
liable for failing to monitor company employees for signs of
wrongdoing. In the 1996 case In re Caremark International Inc.
Derivative Litigation, Delaware's Chancellor Allen considered a
derivative suit claiming that the defendant directors breached their
"duty of care ... in connection with alleged violations by [company]
employees of federal and state laws and regulations applicable to
health care providers. 8 5 The company's employees had a practice of
entering into contracts for services with physicians, at least some of
whom prescribed or recommended services or products that the
company provided.8 6 These contracts raised the possibility of unlawful
"kickbacks," and two officers subsequently faced federal indictments
for violations of the Anti-Referral Payments Law.8 7 In their complaint
against the directors, the shareholders alleged that they "allowed a
situation to develop and continue which exposed the corporation to
enormous legal liability and that in so doing they violated a duty to be
active monitors of corporate performance."88
The chancellor considered the two contexts in which directors
may be personally liable for a breach of the duty to exercise
appropriate attention: (1) where a board decision results in a loss
because that decision was ill-advised or negligent; and (2) where a loss
80. Sale, supra note 5, at 466.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 467.
84. See discussion infra Parts II.A.4, II.B.
85. 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996).
86. Id. at 962.
87. Id. at 962, 964.
88. Id. at 967.
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arises from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in
circumstances in which due attention arguably would have prevented
the loss.8 9 Under the latter context, the chancellor addressed the
significance of the Graham decision, interpreting it to mean that
"absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor
senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming
the integrity of employees and the honesty of their dealings on the
company's behalf."90  The chancellor eschewed a broader rule that
corporate directors might satisfy their obligation of being reasonably
informed without ensuring that information and reporting systems
existed in the corporation.91 Chancellor Allen held instead that "a
director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure
that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board
concludes is adequate, exists" and that a failure to do so could render
a director liable for non-compliance. 92
With regard to the type of oversight failure that might trigger a
fiduciary breach, the chancellor clarified that "only a sustained or
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists-will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability."93  This language suggested that if directors'
duties had been broadened since Graham to include some type of
monitoring requirement, directors at least could take comfort in
knowing that their monitoring efforts would not be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny. As Chancellor Allen noted, "the level of detail that is
appropriate for such an information system is a question of business
judgment."94 The chancellor conceded that "no rationally designed
information and reporting system will remove the possibility that...
directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or otherwise fail
reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation's compliance with
the law."95 The chancellor then concluded that the defendant directors
were not guilty of a sustained failure to exercise their oversight
89. Id. (emphasis omitted). In the second situation, director liability for inattention results
not from a decision but from unconsidered inaction. Id. at 968. Most decisions made by a
corporation, however, are "not the subject of director attention." Id. Only "the most significant
corporate acts or transactions, [such as] mergers, changes in capital structure, fundamental
changes in business, and appointment and compensation of the CEO" require board
authorization. Id.
90. Id. at 969.
91. Id. at 970.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 971.




function and that the corporation's information systems appeared to
represent a good faith attempt to be informed of the relevant facts.96
In Caremark, Chancellor Allen presented an analytical
framework that would reappear in Disney and other cases: he
addressed the directors' procedural violations in terms of their good
faith. 97 Although the plaintiff shareholders alleged a breach of the
duty of care, 98 the chancellor's analysis focused on whether the
directors' actions established "the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability."99  This approach foretold developments in
Delaware and other states following Enron.
4. Post-Enron: Disney's "We Don't Care About the Risks" Attitude
From 1963's Graham to 1996's Caremark, Delaware case law
reflects an evolving judicial perception of a director's fiduciary duties.
Examples include the Van Gorkom court's recognition of the duty of
care as a standalone, functional element of the business judgment rule
and Chancellor Allen's interpretation in Caremark that directors' duty
of care requires a good faith effort to maintain some type of employee
monitoring system. In the post-Enron era, Delaware's most recent
jurisprudential evolution in this area has been an increased emphasis
on the duty of good faith. This approach is manifest in the recent
Disney litigation.
In 2000's Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme Court
addressed Disney shareholders' allegation that their board of
directors' approval of an overly-generous employment contract for the
company's president, Michael Ovitz, was not protected by the business
judgment rule. 100 The complaint against Disney set out various claims
that the directors breached their fiduciary duties to the company, 10 1
including a waste claim based on calculations that Ovitz' severance
96. Id. at 971.
97. See id. at 971-72 (noting that the plaintiffs claims were weak because there was no
evidence "that the defendants either lacked good faith in the exercise of their monitoring
responsibilities or conscientiously permitted a known violation of law by the corporation to
occur").
98. Id. at 960.
99. Id. at 971.
100. 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000).
101. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that (1) the Disney board of directors "breached its
fiduciary duty in approving an extravagant and wasteful [e]mployment [a]greement [for] Michael
S. Ovitz as president of Disney;" (2) the board of directors "breached its fiduciary duty in
agreeing to a 'non-fault' termination of the Ovitz' [e]mployment [a]greement, a decision that was
extravagant and wasteful;" and (3) "the directors were not disinterested and independent." Id. at
248-49.
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package was worth over $140 million. 10 2 But despite the strikingly
lucrative terms of Ovitz's severance package, the court rejected the
waste claim. 10 3 According to the court, "the size and structure of
executive compensation are inherently matters of judgment."10 4 The
court noted that there were outer limits to executive compensation,
but they are confined to "unconscionable cases where directors
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets." 10 5
Moreover, the shareholders' complaint was a "pastiche of prolix
invective" and was "permeated with conclusory allegations of the
pleader and quotations from the media, mostly of an editorial nature
(even including a cartoon)." 10 6  The Supreme Court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint for failing to create a reasonable doubt that the
board's decision to approve the employment contract was protected by
the business judgment rule.10 7 In dismissing the complaint, however,
the court gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to re-plead their case.108
As Chief Justice Norman E. Veasey later stated:
[Tihe complaint was presented in an awful manner.... But we felt there could have
been something in it. In particular, did Disney's board act in good faith in agreeing to
Mr. Ovitz's compensation? Although the company had retained an outside expert, that
expert later admitted that the board had never looked at what it would cost to buy Mr.
Ovitz out. In the end, we said that the shareholder group's arguments were not good
enough to justify setting entirely aside the ruling of the Court of Chancery in favor of
the Disney board. We did say, though, that we would be willing to allow the
stockholders to file a new pleading.109
The court expressed concerns that the Disney directors'
processes in approving Ovitz's employment agreement were "casual, if
not sloppy and perfunctory"' 10 and suggested without subtlety several
ways that the plaintiffs might plead a valid case."1 According to the
court, in a due care case where an expert has advised the board in its
decision-making process, 1 2 the complaint must allege particularized
facts (not conclusions) that would show, for example, that (1) the
102. Id. at 253.
103. Id. at 263-64.
104. Id. at 263.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 249.
107. Id. at 262.
108. Id.
109. What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?: A Roundtable Moderated by Charles
Elson, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan. 2003, at 76 [hereinafter What's Wrong with Executive
Compensation].
110. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
111. Id. at 262.
112. In this case, the directors were advised by an expert and relied upon his expertise in
approving the employment contract. Id. at 261.
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directors did not in fact rely on the expert; (2) their reliance was not in
good faith; (3) they did not reasonably believe that the expert's advice
was within the expert's professional competence; (4) the expert was
not selected with reasonable care, and this faulty selection was
attributable to the directors; (5) the subject matter that was material
and reasonably available was so obvious that the board's failure to
consider it was grossly negligent regardless of the expert's advice; or
(6) that the decision of the board constituted waste or fraud.113
In 2003, the Disney shareholders returned to chancery court
with an amended complaint alleging that the directors should be held
personally liable for a knowing or intentional lack of due care in their
decision-making process regarding Ovitz's employment and
termination. 1 4  This time, Chancellor Chandler denied Disney's
motion to dismiss, noting that the plaintiffs' complaint suggested that
"the Disney directors failed to exercise any business judgment and
failed to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to
Disney and its stockholders." 1 5 According to the complaint, Disney's
CEO, Michael Eisner, unilaterally made the decision to hire Ovitz and
the directors' compensation committee rubber-stamped the
employment agreement, where (1) no draft employment agreements
were presented to the compensation committee for review before it
voted to approve the hiring; (2) the committee met for less than an
hour to approve the hiring, and most of the discussion time was spent
on other topics; (3) the committee received only a summary of the
employment agreement's terms and conditions; and (4) the committee
did not question the agreement or review the documents for
approval. 116
Following the approval of the compensation committee, the
board of directors immediately approved the employment agreement
under similar circumstances. The board spent very little time
discussing the issue during the meeting, during which no
presentations made regarding the terms of the draft agreement, and
board members made no further inquiries. Additionally, no further
review of the employment agreement occurred, even though the
agreement was a "work in progress" at the time of its approval." 7 The
final negotiations over the remaining terms in Ovitz's employment
agreement took place solely between Eisner, Ovitz, and their
113. Id. at 262.
114. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 287.
117. Id.
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attorneys. 118 The final version differed substantially from the original
draft, but no further committee or board review ever occurred. 11 9 At
no point during the course of negotiations with Ovitz was an expert
retained to advise the board, the compensation committee, or
Eisner. 120
Ovitz performed poorly as Disney's president and subsequently
asked Eisner for a non-fault termination. 121 Eisner granted this
request, which entailed a payout to Ovitz of more than $38 million in
cash plus stock options.1 22 The shareholders charged the board of
directors with an "ostrich-like" approach regarding this non-fault
termination. 123 The board apparently never sought to negotiate with
Ovitz regarding his departure nor did it consider whether to seek a
termination based on fault. 124 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that
the board (1) failed to ask why it had not been informed; (2) failed to
inquire about the conditions and terms of the agreement; and (3)
failed even to attempt to stop or delay Ovitz's termination until more
information could be collected. 125
The Disney opinion distinguished between (1) the negligent or
grossly negligent failure of directors "to inform themselves or to
deliberate adequately about an issue of material importance to the
corporation"; and (2) a conscious and intentional disregard for their
directorial responsibilities, characterized by a "we don't care about the
risks" attitude toward material corporate decisions.1 26 According to
the chancellor, this latter kind of knowing or deliberate indifference
constitutes a "breach of the directors' obligation to act honestly and in
good faith in the corporation's best interests."'127 Put differently,
stated the chancellor, the plaintiffs' complaint implied that "the
defendant directors knew that they were making material decisions
without adequate information and without adequate deliberation, and
that they simply did not care . , "128 Viewed in this light, the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 288.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 289.
123. Id. at 288.
124. Id. at 289.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 289. According to the court, the facts alleged in the amended complaint suggested





directors' alleged conduct fell outside the protection of the business
judgment rule. 129
Chancellor Chandler's finding that the directors breached their
duty of good faith was of particular significance because Disney's
exculpatory charter provision protected its directors from personal
damages liability for any breach of their duty of care. 130 As discussed
previously, however, under Delaware law Disney cannot exempt its
directors from liability for acts or omissions not in good faith. 131
Because the chancellor framed the issue as one of good faith and not




Two recent federal circuit court cases that applied Delaware
law-McCall v. Scott133 and In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative
Shareholders Litigation 134-took Disney-like approaches in
considering directors' liability for failing to prevent abusive practices
by management. These cases predate the 2003 Disney chancery court
decision, but present interesting applications of the Caremark
analysis to directorial nonfeasance in deciding questions of bad faith.
Like Disney, these cases involved claims that directors consciously
disregarded their responsibilities. In effect, these are other instances
of the "we don't care about the risks" attitude decried by Chancellor
Chandler in Disney.135
1. The Sixth Circuit
In the 2001 decision McCall v. Scott, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit applied Caremark to determine whether a board
of directors faced liability for failing to take action with respect to
systematic fraud occurring at their healthcare company. 136  The
plaintiff shareholders brought a derivative action alleging that the
129. Id.
130. Id. at 286.
131. Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003)); see also discussion supra Part
II.A.3.
132. Disney, 825 A.2d at 286.
133. 239 F.3d 808, 817-24 (6th Cir. 2001), modified by 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001)
(clarifying the original opinion's discussion of Caremark and the duty of good faith without
rehearing).
134. 325 F.3d 795, 805-11 (7th Cir. 2003).
135. Disney, 825 A.2d at 289.
136. 239 F.3d at 817-19.
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company's senior management, "with board knowledge, devised
schemes to improperly increase revenues" and "perpetuated a
management philosophy that provided strong incentives for employees
to commit fraud." 137 Having failed to make a pre-suit demand on
their board of directors, the plaintiffs alleged demand futility on the
ground that a majority of the directors "had an interest in the
wrongdoing or could not exercise independent judgment with respect
to the asserted claims." 138 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that at
least five directors could not have exercised independent judgment
due to the likelihood of their liability for breach of their duty of care. 139
The court then considered the question of whether the
directors' alleged nonfeasance presented a substantial likelihood of
liability for breach of a fiduciary duty, such that there was a
reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness of a majority of the
board.140 The court applied the Caremark analysis to the directors'
failure to act, stating that unconsidered inaction can be the basis for
director liability.141 The issue was complicated by the fact that the
company's certificate of incorporation, as in the Disney case, included
a waiver of liability which exempted the directors from liability for
breaches of their duty of care. 142 The defendant directors argued that
their ability to exercise independent judgment was not hampered by
fear of personal liability for a breach of their duty of care, as the
waiver exempted them from such liability. 143 The court conceded that
"[w]hen the validity of such a provision is not contested and the
137. Id. at 814.
Fraudulent practices included (1) upcoding by providers, which refers to billing for
services ... for illnesses with a higher degree of complexity and severity than a
patient's condition actually warranted; (2) improper cost reporting ... (3) offering
financial incentives to physicians to increase referrals of Medicare patients to [the
company's] facilities ... and (4) acquisition practices that offered inducements to
executives of target companies and interfered with existing physician relationships.
Id.
138. Id. at 815.
139. Id. at 817.
140. Id. at 817-24.
141. Id. at 817.
142. Specifically, the waiver stated that:
[a] director of the Corporation shall not be personally liable to the Corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director;
provided, however, that the foregoing shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the Corporation or its
stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law ... or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit.
Id. at 818 (emphasis in original). In other words, the waiver agreement provided that directors




factual basis for the claims implicates only a breach of the duty of
care, the waiver may properly be considered and applied in deciding a
motion to dismiss for failure to make a pre-suit demand."144
The plaintiffs maintained that their claims were not barred by
the waiver agreement because there was an exception for "acts or
omissions not in good faith."145 The court agreed with the plaintiffs
that something less than intentional conduct might signal bad faith,
relying upon treatise commentary that "[t]o the extent that
recklessness involves a conscious disregard of a known risk, it could be
argued that such an approach is not one taken in good faith and thus
could not be liability exempted[.]"'146 Also, under the Caremark
analysis, "a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists-will establish [a] lack of
good faith."147 The court then engaged in a lengthy discussion of the
particularized facts of the case and concluded that those facts were
"sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness of
the board," where there was "a substantial likelihood of director
liability for intentional or reckless breach of the duty of care."148
After its initial decision in McCall, the Sixth Circuit amended
its opinion to clarify its reasons for finding an issue as to the directors'
good faith. 49  Discussing Delaware law, the court stated that
"Delaware courts do not discuss a breach of the duty of care in terms
of a mental state more culpable than gross negligence. Rather,
allegations of intentional or reckless director misconduct are more
commonly characterized as... a breach of the duty of good faith."' 50
The court concluded, therefore, that while "duty of care claims alleging
only grossly negligent conduct are precluded by [an exculpatory
charter provision], it appears that duty of care claims based on
reckless or intentional misconduct are not."'151
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting the waiver provision).
146. Id. (quoting BALOTTi & FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION § 4.29, at 4-116 to 4-116.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2000)).
147. Id. at 817 (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996)).
148. Id. at 819-24.
149. McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 2001).
150. Id. at 1000.
151. Id.
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2. The Seventh Circuit
In 2003, the Seventh Circuit applied the Caremark decision in
In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation, a
shareholders' derivative action that questioned the directors' good
faith. 152 The plaintiff shareholders sought to hold the directors
personally liable for extensive corporate losses caused by continuing
FDA violations. 153 Specifically, the company failed to heed multiple
FDA warnings that it was violating regulations in manufacturing
various medical diagnostic products. 154 The plaintiffs claimed that the
directors were aware of the company's noncompliance problems and
that they breached their fiduciary duty by failing "to take necessary
action to correct these problems."'155 The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the plaintiffs that the directors were not "blamelessly unaware of the
conduct leading to corporate liability."'156  Under the company's
corporate governance procedures, "information of the FDA violations
would have been shared at the board meetings."'157 In addition,
plaintiffs alleged that "the directors all signed the annual SEC forms
which specifically addressed government regulations of the company's
products."'158 The alleged facts implied that the directors were aware
of the company's noncompliance problems, and their failure to act was
not the product of "unconsidered" inaction. 159
For the purposes of establishing demand futility, 160 the court
then considered whether the directors' decision not to address the
company's noncompliance problems fell outside the protections of the
business judgment rule.16' Despite having already concluded that the
directors' inaction was not "unconsidered," as was the case in
Caremark, the court proceeded to use the Caremark analysis in
152. 325 F.3d 795, 808-809 (7th Cir. 2003).
153. Id. at 801.
154. Id. at 799-801.
155. Id. at 802.
156. Id. at 806 (citation omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citation omitted). In this respect, the Abbott directors differed from those in
Caremark, whose liability was "predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities." Id. at
806 (citation omitted).
160. Plaintiffs failed to make any demand on the company's directors to "institute an action
against themselves for breach of their fiduciary duties, stating that such a demand would have
been futile." Id. at 802. Under Delaware law, demand futility is established if "the alleged
particularized facts raise a reasonable doubt that ... the challenged transaction was the product
of a valid exercise of the directors' business judgment." Id. at 807 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)).
161. Id. at 807-09.
2005]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
determining whether the directors' actions established a lack of good
faith.162 Quoting Caremark, the court stated that "a sustained or
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight.., will establish
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to [director]
liability."'163 The court found that the extensive paper trail of FDA
warnings implicated a sustained and systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight, where the directors took no steps to prevent or
remedy the situation.164 Thus, "six years of noncompliance,
inspections,... Warning Letters, and notice in the press...
indicate[d] that the directors' decision to not act was not made in good
faith and was contrary to the best interests of the company.' 65
C. SEC Enforcement Action
In addition to enforcing the reforms wrought by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
increased its efforts to "punish corporate fraud by pursuing charges
against board members who ignore misconduct."'' 66 In its April 2003
complaint filed in the pending case of SEC v. Chancellor Corp.,1 67 the
SEC charged an outside director of a corporation with securities fraud
for "fail[ing] to oversee [the company's] financial reporting, exercising
no care to ensure that the company had appropriate accounting
procedures and internal controls and that its financial records were
accurate."'168 This action marks the first time the SEC has brought a
case against an outside director not directly involved in the company's
fraud 69 and probably is a "sign of things to come."' 70 According to SEC
162. Id. at 808-09.
163. Id. at 808.
164. Id. at 809 (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996)). Interestingly, the Abbott court focused on the "sustained and systematic failure of
the board to exercise oversight" language from Caremark in its analysis, although this language
was used in Caremark in the context of an unconsidered failure of the board to act in
circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss. Id. at 808-09.
The Abbott court made clear that the facts in that case were inapposite to Caremark ("reasonable
inferences determined from all of the facts taken together are exactly the opposite of Caremark;
members of the board in Abbott were aware of the problems"), yet used the same analysis. Id. at
806, 808-09.
165. Id. at 809.
166. Bilodeau, supra note 13, at 51.
167. SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 03-10762 MEL (D. Mass. filed Apr. 24, 2003).
168. Complaint 60, SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 03-10762 MEL [hereinafter Complaint],
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/compl8104.htm.
169. Bilodeau, supra note 13, at 51.
170. See id. (quoting former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt, who stated that "[tihis is definitely a
sign of things to come. The commission has made it clear it wants outside directors to uphold the
highest standards. This case definitely shows the agency's determination to go after them.").
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enforcement chief Stephen Cutler, this complaint is the "first salvo in
this area [of holding outside directors liable]" and will serve as a
model for future enforcement actions. 171
According to the SEC, the Chancellor Corporation's "former
Chairman, CEO, and controlling shareholder orchestrated a scheme to
inflate reported assets, revenue and profits using fabricated
documents and fraudulent accounting."'174 The defendant director,
Rudolph Peselman, was on Chancellor's board from 1996-2001 and a
member of the board's audit committee from 1999-2001.175 In 1999,
Peselman became aware of a disagreement between Chancellor's
officers and outside auditors concerning an acquisition. 176 At the
CEO's direction, Chancellor had overstated its revenue and income for
1998 by improperly accounting for the acquisition, which closed in
January 1999.177 When Chancellor's outside auditors objected to this
improper consolidation of Chancellor's financial results with those of
the acquired company, Chancellor's CEO and chief operating officer
fired them. 178 Peselman approved the dismissal of the auditors and
did not determine whether Chancellor's position on the accounting
issue was incorrect. 79
In 1999, Chancellor filed a Form 10-KSB for the year ending
December 31, 1998, which was signed by Peselman. °80 According to
the SEC, Peselman signed this form "without taking any steps to
ensure that it did not contain materially misleading statements."'181
He did not inquire into the reasons for the 1998 consolidation of
Chancellor's and the acquired company's financial statements, even
though Chancellor's auditors had opposed it.182 Also, Peselman "knew
that Chancellor had written off $1.14 million in related party
payments in 1997."183 Despite this knowledge, he signed the "1998
financial statements reflecting millions of dollars in side payments
without checking whether there was adequate support for the
171. Id.
174. SEC Sues Former Top Officers, supra note 14, at 130-31.
175. Complaint, supra note 168, $ 17.
176. Id. 26-29.
177. Id. 22.
178. Id. 77 23-28.







amounts and whether the related party arrangements were
adequately disclosed."'184
Peselman also signed two subsequent restatements of
Chancellor's 1998 financial results, which were contrary to
representations made in the original Form 10-KSB. 185 Peselman
allegedly "ignored these red flags and never questioned whether there
was any basis for the change and whether it was appropriate."'186 The
SEC claimed that in so acting, Peselman had "completely neglected to
fulfill his duties as a director and as an audit committee member."'187
Specifically, he allegedly "failed to oversee Chancellor's financial
reporting, exercising no care to ensure that the company had
appropriate accounting procedures and internal controls and that its
financial records were accurate.' ' 8 8
III. BARK OR BITE: EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF POST-ENRON CASE
LAW AND REGULATORY ACTION
The recent developments in Delaware and other case law and
the SEC's recent foray into the area of directors' fiduciary duties
indicate, at the very least, heightened judicial and regulatory concern
for enforcing existing corporate governance standards. The critical
questions for corporate directors are whether and to what degree
courts and the federal government are actually changing those
standards in ways that will affect directors' personal liability
exposure. These questions can be addressed by considering (1)
whether recent case law has created new standards for applying the
business judgment rule and (2) whether the SEC's recent move to
regulate directors broadens directors' liability exposure beyond state
law standards.
A. Post-Enron Application of the Business Judgment Rule
In the wake of Enron and other corporate governance scandals,
courts have resuscitated Van Gorkom-style procedural review by
framing the issue as one of good faith. The good faith exception to
directors' exculpatory provisions "now seems inexorably tied to due
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indicate that the directors failed to act in good faith."18 9 The critical
question for directors-whether this new judicial approach heightens
their standard of care-is informed by the Disney, McCall, and Abbott
decisions.
1. Case law
Many believe that the Disney decision signals a higher
standard of care for directors. 190 But despite these misgivings about
Disney and the continued viability of the business judgment rule,191
there is no real indication in that case that Delaware has changed the
standards by which courts apply the rule. The Disney finding that the
plaintiffs had satisfactorily alleged bad faith was based on facts that,
if true, "[did] more than portray directors who, in a negligent or
grossly negligent manner, merely failed to inform themselves or to
deliberate adequately about an issue of material importance to their
corporation."'' 92 In other words, the court's finding that there might be
a breach of the duty of good faith was not supported simply by a run-
of-the-mill duty of care violation. Instead, there was more to the
plaintiffs' claim: "[T]he facts alleged in the new complaint suggest that
the defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded their
responsibilities .... Knowing or deliberate indifference by a
director... is conduct, in my opinion, that may not have been taken
honestly and in good faith...."193
The court's analysis, therefore, did not substantially depart
from the standard by which courts have traditionally determined a
breach of the duty of good faith. Delaware case law has measured bad
faith in terms of the irrationality of directors' decisions. 194 Under this
approach, there are substantive limits to what courts will consider a
good faith decision if the decision appears to be grossly inadequate. 95
189. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353,
373 (2004).
190. This belief was explicitly stated at an ALI-ABA Course of Study in 2004. See Roger C.
Siske, Legal Standards for Adoption of Executive Compensation Programs and Contracts, in
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: STRATEGY, DESIGN, & IMPLEMENTATION 1, 8 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, June 17-18, 2004).
191. See Gibeaut, supra note 8, at 41 ("[Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Norman
Veasey] often comes across directors who wonder whether Delaware has abandoned the old
rules.").
192. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivate Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
193. Id.
194. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000); see also discussion supra Part II.A.1.
195. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 610 (Del. Ch. 1974) (noting that the case
did not involve "blatant self-dealing" because "arm's length bargaining marked the transaction
and the vote of interested directors was not necessary to approve the transaction").
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Also, the Delaware Supreme Court has included procedural review in
determining directors' good faith. 196 The basic idea seems to be that
some decisions-albeit made by independent and disinterested
directors-are so substantively or procedurally unsound that they
could not have been made in good faith. In effect, this is what the
Disney decision says about the directors' approval of the Ovitz
severance package and Ovitz's subsequent no-fault termination. The
directors' procedural failings were so severe that they appeared to be
knowing and deliberate. 97
Other jurisdictions also have not fundamentally changed the
standards of the business judgment rule. In McCall, the Sixth Circuit
found the defendant directors' good faith to be at issue where their
failure to exercise oversight of management suggested an intentional
or reckless breach of the duty of care. 198 In its amended opinion, the
court took care to differentiate this type of breach from an ordinary
breach of the duty of care involving only gross negligence (which does
not implicate bad faith).199 Likewise, in Abbott, the Seventh Circuit
found that the directors acted in bad faith because they intentionally
failed to exercise oversight of the company.200 The court inferred that
the directors' procedural failures were intentional because "the
directors knew of the violations of law [and] took no steps in an effort
to prevent or remedy the situation .... 20 Both McCall and Abbott
(like Disney) involved breaches of the duty of care that went beyond
the traditional standard of gross negligence.
Viewed in this light, none of these cases represent a departure
from the traditional application of the business judgment rule.
Directors should not worry that an "ordinary" (i.e., unintentional and
non-reckless) breach of the duty of care will trigger a good faith
violation rendering them personally liable to shareholders. To the
extent that courts have increasingly integrated procedural review into
their good faith determinations, one might conclude that the judicial
196. See Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 76-77 (Del. 1997) (finding
no abuse of discretion by the Chancery Court when it reviewed the procedures taken by the
defendant-directors).
197. Note that the Disney court did not approach the question of the directors' good faith
under a Gimbel-like substantive review of the challenged decision. See 825 A.2d at 285-91. One
might argue that the alleged $140 million value of Ovitz's severance package would have
qualified as "grossly inadequate," for the purpose of establishing lack of good faith under a
Gimbel analysis. Id. at 279. The Brehm court, however, undertook substantive review of the
Ovitz severance package under the plaintiffs' waste claim and found the package to be within the
acceptable bounds. 746 A.2d at 262-64.
198. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 817-24 (6th Cir. 2001).
199. McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 1000 (6th Cir. 2001).
200. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 2003).
201. Id.
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conception of "irrationality"-used to show a lack of good faith-
involves tighter scrutiny of directors' actions. But this focus on
process has not gone so far as to erase the distinction between the
duty of care and good faith elements of the business judgment rule.
As seen in cases like Disney, McCall and Abbott, courts have retained
different standards for applying these elements.
2. Judicial Commentary
It also is instructive to consider the words of the decision-
makers themselves. Delaware's Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey and
Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. have provided valuable insight for
directors about changing judicial expectations in this area. Their
comments reinforce the notion that while the business judgment rule
continues to offer the same protections to directors in the post-Enron
era, courts will now subject directors' actions to stricter procedural
review. 20 2 The Chief Justice's and Vice Chancellor's remarks also
illustrate the particular usefulness of procedural review in certain
circumstances: (1) for courts when substantive review of the directors'
decision is impossible (or nearly so); and (2) for plaintiffs when the
defendant directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision
from personal liability for a breach of the duty of care. 20 3
According to Chief Justice Veasey, "the business judgment rule
still applies to protect directors' decisions made in good faith [but]
[w]hat has evolved in this new era is a sharper judicial focus on
process."20 4 This scrutiny reflects increased expectations for directors
to be proactive. In a recent roundtable discussion on executive
compensation, the Chief Justice described a change in the way courts
should now review director conduct:
[There has been] created a new set of expectations for directors. And that is changing
how courts look at these issues .... [I]f directors claim to be independent by saying, for
example, that they base decisions on some performance measure and don't do so, or if
they are disingenuous or dishonest about it, it seems to me that the courts in some
circumstances could treat their behavior as a breach of the fiduciary duty of good
faith.
2 0 5
Notably, Chief Justice Veasey mentioned that directors' bad
faith might be shown by a failure to base decisions on predetermined
performance measures. 20 6  This statement appears to distinguish
202. E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance Principles,
56 SMU L. REV. 2135, 2139 (2003).
203. Id.
204. Id.




between a director's negligent failure to make an informed decision-
the standard for a breach of the duty of care-and a director's failure
to follow predetermined decision-making procedures. The latter
situation suggests something more than mere negligence; courts
rightfully can infer that this type of disregard for process must be
intentional or at least recklessly indifferent.
Chief Justice Veasey's comments also identify a particular
benefit of procedural review in a court's good faith analysis:
procedural review is useful in contexts where it is impossible (or
nearly so) for courts to judge directors' good faith on the substantive
outcome of their decisions. For example, in the area of executive
compensation, the Chief Justice has stated that there are no set limits
on dollar amounts that can be paid in good faith,20 7 but there may be
limits defined by process.208 In Disney, the lucrative terms of Michael
Ovitz's compensation package were insufficient in themselves to
create an issue of fiduciary breach, but the plaintiffs' facts, "if true,
[implied] that the defendant directors knew that they were making
material decisions without adequate information and without
adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if the
decisions caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury
or loss.
'209
Delaware's Vice Chancellor Strine also commented on the post-
Enron state of corporate governance law, specifically with regard to
new approaches to the duty of good faith. According to Vice
Chancellor Strine:
Enron will also generate increased pressure on courts to examine carefully the
plausibility of directors' claims that they were able to devote sufficient time to their
duties to have carried them out in good faith .... Enron and situations like it suggest to
me that skillful plaintiffs' lawyers will begin making common-sense arguments about
the disconnect between the routine tasks directors [undertake] to perform and the effort
they put in to accomplish them. These arguments might sharpen the importance of
"state of mind" determinations in the adjudication of corporate cases ... [due to] the
prevalence of exculpatory charter provisions that exonerate directors for due care
breaches.... []n the absence of evidence that the outside directors had a financial
interest in the underlying misconduct, they force plaintiffs' counsel to challenge the
state of mind (i.e., the good faith) of the outside directors. 2 10
207. See Veasey, supra note 6, at 850 ('There is a belief-I suggest it is a myth-that there is
no limit to what compensation committees may award CEO's and other senior managers. Of
course, there is no bright-line dollar limit. [According to one metaphor,] 'large, heavy ships can
float.' Likewise, there is no such thing as pay that is abstractly too high-it is like asking, '[h]ow
high is up?' ") (footnote omitted).
208. Veasey, supra note 202, at 2141.
209. 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
210. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371, 1385-86 (2002).
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This language highlights the practical motivations for plaintiff
shareholders who want to hold directors liable for injuries to the
corporation, but must overcome the obstacle of an exculpatory charter
provision. The plaintiffs can use the same facts to allege a breach of
the duty of good faith instead of a breach of the duty of care (and
thereby sidestep the directors' exculpatory provision), as long as the
directors' procedural failings are sufficiently egregious to suggest
intentional or reckless conduct. So, while plaintiffs face a different,
more demanding standard to create a good faith issue, they at least
have a chance to hold the directors personally liable under the same
set of facts.
B. The SEC's Expanded Regulatory Focus
The true significance of SEC v. Chancellor Corp. remains to be
seen; at this point, it is clear only that the SEC considers the action to
be a blueprint for future prosecutions of outside directors who are
"reckless in their oversight of management and asleep at the
switch."211 This approach is noteworthy because the SEC effectively is
transforming a matter of state law-"a classic case of director breach
of fiduciary duty"212-into an enforcement action under the federal
securities laws.213 Former SEC insiders have speculated about the
meaning and long-term consequences of the SEC's move. 214 According
to former SEC enforcement director and retired federal judge Stanley
Sporkin, "the Chancellor action 'may well be a landmark case, where
the person didn't profit, didn't buy and sell, but just fiddled while
Rome burned .... It means that people who take these jobs as outside
directors have got to be careful and make sure they're really prepared
to do the job."' 21 5 But others have voiced concerns about the SEC's
apparent broadening of its regulatory focus. Former SEC general
counsel David Becker has said that "[t]he SEC may be expanding its
enforcement authority without sufficient consideration or planning. '216
According to Becker, "[i]f the SEC is in effect going to be federalizing
state corporate law, it means the agency is undertaking a huge new
211. Bilodeau, supra note 13, at 51.
212. Loewenstein, supra note 189, at 368.
213. Id. at 368-69.
214. See, e.g., Bilodeau, supra note 13, at 51 (quoting former SEC general counsel David
Becker and former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt); Otis Bilodeau, Directors Who Turn a Blind Eye
to Fraud Face SEC Sanctions, PIrTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 2003, at C19, available at
2003 WL 55966860 (quoting former SEC enforcement director Stanley Sporkin).




responsibility, and it means directors are going to be vulnerable not
only to private litigants, but also to the feds. '217
Commentators also have debated the wisdom of bringing
regulatory actions against outside directors. Questioning the policy
behind the SEC's move, John Olson, chairman of the ABA's corporate
responsibility task force, stated that "[t]he SEC should be careful in
going after directors, because it could make it difficult to find people
who will serve on boards ."218 In an opinion piece, another
commentator considered both sides of the issue.219 On the one hand,
"[some argue that] directors' conduct should be policed only by the
states, which have historically exercised that authority, and not by the
SEC. And if directors are also going to be held accountable to the
feds, ... it will become tougher than ever to recruit capable
directors."220 But, in considering the other side, Olson stated that
"[h]owever tough it becomes to recruit and retain competent directors,
shareholders have the absolute right to demand that board members
protect them from executives who are scoundrels or fools. Directors
who don't direct, those who are ineffective at countering arrogant
managers who lose their moral bearings, invite questionable
practices [.]"221
Putting aside policy concerns and assuming that SEC v.
Chancellor does indeed portend a new trend of regulatory enforcement
against outside directors, the key question for directors is whether this
development will expand their liability exposure. The answer seems
to be that such enforcement actions will not expand state law
standards for director conduct, but may expose directors who are
otherwise protected by exculpatory charter provisions. A comparison
of the Chancellor action to existing case law reveals no material
expansion of the standards imposed by state corporate law. For
example, the SEC complaint charged Rudolph Peselman with ignoring
"red flags,"222 which is hardly a new ground for directorial liability.
The Delaware Supreme Court contemplated liability for this type of
misconduct over forty years ago in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
217. Id.
218. Id. According to Olson, "[tlhis is a risky path for the SEC to start down .... You've got
to be careful you only use this weapon in cases where everyone would say 'this was a total failure
by this director."' Id.
219. Marc J. Lane, Opinion, There's No Compromising With Weak-Kneed Directors, CRAIN'S
CHI. Bus., Oct. 6, 2003, at 11, available at 2003 WL 9126405.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Complaint, supra note 168, 59.
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Manufacturing Co. 223 Of course, the type of liability involved in the
SEC action-securities fraud under federal law-differs from that
presented by a shareholders' action in a case like Graham. But in a
general sense, the "red flag" language in SEC v. Chancellor does not
require more of directors than existing state law.
Likewise, the SEC's claim that Peselman "failed to oversee
Chancellor's financial reporting, exercising no care to ensure that the
company had appropriate accounting procedures and internal controls
and that its financial records were accurate"224 implicates the
Caremark duty to maintain a corporate "information and reporting
system."225  The claim that Peselman "acquiesced in [the CEO's]
complete control of accounting decisions, including those relating to
payments to [the CEO's] own company"226 seems to parallel the claims
in Disney against the directors who adopted a "we don't care about the
risks" attitude227 and acquiesced in Michael Eisner's compensation
decisions. In making these claims, the SEC reflects the same concern
for proactive action by directors that is emphasized in recent
jurisprudence. 228 But although the SEC seems to be jumping on the
courts' bandwagon to heighten expectations for directors, it has not
yet advocated for a more expansive approach than that already
employed by Delaware and other courts.
The greater significance of SEC v. Chancellor is that the SEC
has added another type of liability threat for directors, one that is not
barred by an exculpatory provision in the corporate charter.229 Just as
directors' exculpatory provisions cannot protect them when courts
frame their misconduct in terms of good faith (and not duty of care), so
too directors cannot escape liability for securities fraud. In effect,
"[tihe SEC is now filling the void created by [exculpatory provisions],
and while Delaware directors may be freed from liability for monetary
damages to their shareholders for breach of the duty of care, they face
enforcement actions from the SEC."230
223. 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("[I]t appears that directors are entitled to rely on the
honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that
something is wrong. If such occurs and goes unheeded, then liability of the directors might well
follow ... ").
224. Complaint, supra note 168, 60.
225. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
226. Complaint, supra note 168, 60.
227. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
228. See, e.g., id. passim.
229. See Loewenstein, supra note 189, at 369-70.
230. Id. at 369-70.
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TV. GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS
A. Procedural Failures that May Expose Directors to State Law or SEC
Liability
In both recent corporate governance jurisprudence and the
SEC's expanded focus on director liability, the key theme is the use of
procedural review to hold certain directors personally accountable in
nontraditional ways. The cases make clear, however, that the
standards of the business judgment rule remain intact. 231 A negligent
or grossly negligent procedural failure is insufficient to trigger a good
faith violation; there must be something akin to intentional or reckless
directorial conduct. 232 The critical issue for directors is the types of
failures or nonfeasance that are sufficiently egregious to implicate
such a finding of bad faith. Admittedly, the variously-described
indicia of bad faith procedural failures-knowing or deliberate
indifference, 233 egregiousness, 234 conscious disregard of a known
risk,235-may leave some confusion about the differences between
recklessness or gross negligence and bad faith.236 The cases and select
judicial commentary suggest three general courses of conduct that
directors should avoid in this context: (1) failure to maintain a
reasonable corporate monitoring and reporting system; (2) failure to
address proactively warning signs of employee misconduct; and (3)
failure to observe predetermined processes or industry norms in
decision making.
231. See discussion supra Part III.
232. See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 1000 (6th Cir. 2001):
Indeed, Delaware courts do not discuss a breach of the duty of care in terms of a
mental state more culpable than gross negligence. Rather, allegations of intentional
or reckless director misconduct are more commonly characterized as ... a breach of
the duty of good faith. ... Thus, while it is true that duty of care claims alleging only
grossly negligent conduct are precluded by [an exculpatory] waiver provision, it
appears that duty of care claims based on reckless or intentional misconduct are not.
233. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
234. Sale, supra note 5, at 484.
235. McCall, 239 F.3d at 818 (quoting BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION § 4.29, at 4-116 to 4-116.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2000)).
236. See id. ("[T]o the extent that the conduct alleged to be reckless is predicated solely on
allegations of sustained inattention to the duty it is arguable whether such conduct is 'grossly
negligent,' but not conduct amounting to bad faith.").
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1. Failure to Maintain a Reasonable Monitoring and Reporting System
Under Caremark, directors are obligated to "attempt in good
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system,
which the board concludes is adequate, exists[.]" 237 Otherwise stated,
''only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists-will establish the lack of
good faith."238 At the very least, this language requires directors to
install and maintain some type of reporting system to satisfy the duty
of good faith.
But does the Caremark good faith analysis also consider the
level of detail of the directors' reporting system? Although the court's
specific reference to an "attempt to assure a reasonable information
and reporting system exists" 239 might imply such an approach, the rest
of the Caremark opinion suggests otherwise. Chancellor Allen
requires an "utter failure" by directors to establish a lack of good
faith.240 Earlier in the opinion, the chancellor also states that "the
level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a
question of business judgment," and "it is important that the board
exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation's' information and
reporting system is in concept and design adequate."241  Thus, the
Caremark analysis does not hinge upon whether the directors
maintained a successful or detailed reporting system; rather, the
analysis considers whether the directors made a good faith attempt to
maintain a system that they felt would be reasonable and adequate.
Although Caremark involved an alleged breach of the duty of
care and not, strictly speaking, an allegation of bad faith, courts
subsequently have adopted Caremark as an integral part of their good
faith analyses. 242 The duty of good faith thus requires directors to
maintain a reporting and disclosure system that they believe is
reasonable and adequate for their corporation. As long as the
directors' decision does not suggest "irrationality" to the court, 243 the
237. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
238. Id. at 971.
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 970.
242. See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 817-18 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Abbott Labs.
Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2001).
243. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating
that even if a judge or jury disagrees with the substance of a decision, there is no ground for
director liability "so long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational
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specifics of the reporting system, including the level of detail, are left
to the directors' discretion.
2. Failure to Address "Red Flags"
Directors' duty of good faith also requires them to address
proactively any warning signals of employee misconduct. This
requirement is rooted in the 1963 Graham decision, which placed
liability on a director who "has recklessly reposed confidence in an
obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly
to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either willfully or
through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing. '244
Although written over forty years ago, this language reflects a concern
for the same types of conduct that have figured into more recent cases'
procedurally-based good faith analyses. The Graham court was
concerned about "reckless[]" and "willful[]" ignorance by directors of
warning signs at their companies. 245 Likewise, in the recent McCall
and Abbott cases, the circuit courts considered the directors' good faith
in terms of an "intentional or reckless breach of the duty of care"246
and "a "failure of the board to exercise oversight [that was]
intentional."247
These circuit court cases provide some general guidance as to
the kinds of "red flags" that require a proactive response by directors.
One factor that courts may consider is the experience of the directors.
In McCall, where the court found a substantial likelihood that the
defendant directors could be liable for good faith violations, "[a]
significant factor in [the court's] assessment of the factual allegations
was the prior experience of a number of the defendants as directors or
managers [in the industry]. '"248 A second factor is the nature of the
"red flags" themselves. The McCall court stated that "the magnitude
and duration of the alleged wrongdoing [that the directors ignored] is
relevant in determining whether the failure of the directors to act
constitutes a lack of good faith."249
The McCall analysis seems to involve two general types of "red
flags" that directors cannot ignore in good faith: internal information
or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests") (emphasis added and emphasis
of "good faith" omitted).
244. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. McCall, 239 F.3d at 817.
247. Abbott, 325 F.3d at 809.
248. McCall, 239 F.3d at 819.
249. Id. at 823 (citation omitted).
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(e.g., audit committee reports) that reasonably suggests employee
misconduct; and challenges or communications from outside the
company (e.g., third party lawsuits, media investigations, etc.) that
reasonably suggest employee misconduct. For example, the court
concluded that the directors must have understood the significance of
audit reports that showed accounting discrepancies and suspicious
billing practices. 250 Also, the court inferred directorial knowledge of
company fraud based on various signals from third parties: a qui tam
action brought against the company by a doctor; an extensive federal
investigation of the company's billing practices; and a prominent
newspaper's investigation of the company.251
Abbott also involved instances in which the defendant directors
ignored warning signals from third parties. Over six years, the
directors failed to respond adequately to thirteen separate FDA
inspection reports and four certified FDA Warning Letters regarding
various regulatory violations. 25 2 Given the "extensive paper trail"
documenting "six years of noncompliance, inspections, [inspection
reports], Warning Letters, and notice in the press, ... the directors'
decision to not act was not made in good faith[.]" 253 In reaching its
conclusion, the court considered the magnitude and duration of these
"red flags" per the McCall approach.254 The magnitude and duration
of the FDA violations were so great that they occasioned the highest
ever fine imposed by the FDA.255 Neither FDA censures nor public
notice motivated the directors to take any action concerning the
compliance problem over a six-year period (as opposed to an
approximately two-year period in McCall).256
In these cases, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have adopted an
approach that considers the duration and magnitude of the warning
signals when determining whether directors' failure to respond
constitutes a lack of good faith. These warning signals can come from
within the company or from the outside (in the form of third party
actions, regulatory pressure, or media coverage). While there appears
to be no bright line for this type of inquiry, McCall and Abbott
involved "red flags" that continued for a matter of years without an
adequate, proactive response from the defendant directors. Both cases
250. Id. at 821 ("We find that it would be just as reasonable to infer that the consistently
high CMIs and DRGs was a sign of possible improper billing activities.").
251. Id. at 822-23.
252. Abbott, 325 F.3d at 799.






also involved directorial failures to respond to federal regulatory
pressures. 257 In evaluating directors' inaction in the face of these
types of warning signals, the Sixth Circuit also found the prior
experience of the directors in that industry to be a significant factor. 258
3. Failure to Observe Predetermined Processes and Industry Norms
Directors also may be found to have acted in bad faith by
failing to observe predetermined processes or industry norms in
decision making. In Disney, for example, the directors failed to ask
even the most basic questions about the Ovitz employment agreement
and, at various steps in the compensation approval process, agreed to
unresolved terms or terms that they had not reviewed.259 Effectively,
the Disney board rubber-stamped Eisner's decision to hire Ovitz and
left the two of them to work out the terms of the agreement. Likewise,
the Disney directors never met to discuss Eisner's proposed no-fault
termination of Ovitz, a decision that resulted in a $38 million cash
payout plus stock options. 260 In finding that the alleged facts, if true,
were sufficient to support a finding of bad faith, the Disney court
concluded that the defendant directors must have known that they
were making material decisions without adequate information and
simply did not care.261
Disney suggests that bad faith is implicated when a director
knows that he is breaching his duty of care. The notion seems to be
that some predetermined processes or directorial norms are so obvious
that a director's disregard for them must be either intentional or
recklessly indifferent. The key feature of this analysis is that the
court will infer knowledge on the part of the director that he is not
acting in the best interests of the corporation. Delaware's Vice
Chancellor Strine has commented that "[plaintiffs] might well ask
courts to infer not only that audit committee members did not know
enough about their company's financial and accounting practices, but
also that the committee members knew that their inadequate
knowledge disabled them from discharging their responsibilities with
fidelity." 262  In other words, the Vice Chancellor suggests that a
257. In McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 822 (6th Cir. 2001), where the FBI and other agencies
conducted dozens of raids to search company facilities in several states, the magnitude of the
federal investigation was particularly great.
258. Id. at 819.
259. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286-88 (Del. Ch. 2003).
260. Id. at 288-89.
261. Id. at 289.
262. Strine, supra note 210, at 1393.
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process violation must be accompanied by some type of awareness by
directors that they are short-changing the corporation.
In this context, it is impossible create a bright-line rule for the
types of process that, if disregarded, necessarily indicate that a
director knew he was short-changing the corporation. Delaware's
Chief Justice Veasey has stated that there is no definitive answer for
the types of procedural failures that might implicate good faith
concerns, but "the utter failure to follow the minimum expectations of
the evolving standards of director conduct, the minimum expectations
of Sarbanes-Oxley, or the NYSE or NASDAQ Rules" might raise a
good faith issue.263 Thus, the Chief Justice provides some guidance for
directors concerned about the procedural standards by which courts
will judge their good faith. Other observers agree that "federal and
stock exchange governance requirements will come to inform a court's
analysis of whether a director has met his obligation to act in good
faith. '264 But these possible guideposts cannot completely define the
boundaries of good faith; directors must accept that courts will
scrutinize their actions for intentional or reckless duty of care
violations using standards, not-bright line rules. 265
B. Corporate Governance Solutions
In the context of this Note, the most important question for
directors is how they can be sufficiently proactive so that courts will
find that the directors exercised due care and, most importantly, acted
in good faith-even if the directors' conduct resulted in injury to the
corporation. In the area of corporate governance, "one size doesn't fit
all"267 and there is no single, best solution for practitioners with
corporate clients. Corporate governance best practices depend upon a
company's stage of development, ownership structure and size, and
the mix of skills and personalities of the individual directors. 268 But
regardless of their configuration, in the wake of Enron and other
scandals, boards need to shift their emphasis beyond their traditional
263. Veasey, supra note 202, at 2141.
264. Theodore N. Mirvis et al., Implications of the Current U.S. Regulatory Environment on
Mergers & Acquisitions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE, at 675, 689 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 2773, 2004).
265. See Sale, supra note 5, at 491 ("Delaware courts deploy standards, not rules.").
267. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & CHRISTIAN A. PLATH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEST




advisory role.269 Boards can no longer act as "advisors" who wait for
management to approach them, but must become active overseers of
the company's business.270 On this topic, Chief Justice Veasey has
stated:
I would urge boards of directors to demonstrate their independence, hold executive
sessions, and follow governance procedures sincerely and effectively, not only as a guard
against the intrusion of the federal government but as a guard against anything that
might happen to them in court from a properly presented complaint. Compensation
committees should have their own advisers and lawyers. Directors who are supposed to
be independent should have the guts to be a pain in the neck and act independently.
2 7 1
Directors can facilitate these goals (and satisfy their Caremark
oversight and monitoring duties) through an effective internal control
framework.272 Such a framework might include three broad categories
of internal controls: (1) financial reporting controls; (2) operation
controls; and (3) compliance controls. 273 Financial reporting controls
cover the preparation of reliable financial statements and other
financial information. 274 Operational controls address a company's
basic business objectives, including adherence to performance
standards and the safeguarding of resources. 275 Finally, compliance
controls cover laws and regulations to which a company is subject to
avoid damage to a company's reputation or other negative
consequences. 276  These controls address and hopefully prevent a
range of employee misconduct that can create liability questions for
directors under state or federal law (e.g., fraudulent accounting
practices, irrational business transactions, or regulatory
noncompliance). Of course, an effective monitoring and oversight
program may require modification when necessary to accommodate
changed conditions.277 This adjustment can be accomplished through
ongoing monitoring activities, self-assessments, and internal audits. 278
Directors also can ensure that they do not disregard "red flags"
by conducting regular reviews of management's operations, with an
269. Id. at 11.
270. Id.
271. What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?, supra note 109, at 76.
272. See BRANCATO & PLATH, supra note 267, at 54 (noting that "as part of its duty of care
the board needs to play an active oversight role in the area of internal controls by ensuring the
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eye toward certain types of misconduct.27 9 For example, directors
should watch for business transactions that are not well-understood
and appear to serve little practical purpose. 280  Discrepancies in
financial documents, such as unusual balance sheet changes or
accounting policies that vary from industry norms, also might
constitute "red flags. ' 28 1 Moreover, directors should be suspicious if
the company is doing too well; for example, directors should look
closely at financial results that are significantly better than
competitors' without substantive differences in operations; overly
optimistic news releases by management; or a consistently close or
exact match between reported results and planned results.282 This is
not an exhaustive list of "red flags," 28 3 but it illustrates the potential
benefits for directors of having predetermined review procedures for
management activities.
In the context of Disney and, more generally, executive
compensation, companies should have entirely independent
compensation committees to ensure that compensation programs are
reasonable in view of company economics and the relevant practices of
similar companies. 28 4  The minimum duties for a compensation
committee should include reviewing and approving CEO compensation
on the basis of performance goals; and making recommendations to
the board with respect to incentive and equity-based compensation
plans.285  The committees should link compensation to rational,
strategic performance measures such as cost of capital, return on
equity, economic value added, and compliance goals.286 There are
many such quantitative and qualitative performance metrics upon
which a compensation committee can choose to base executive
compensation. 28 7 Regardless of which metrics are used, they need to
be determined at the outset of the decision-making process. 288 Agreed-
upon performance metrics generally should not be subsequently
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adjusted to provide additional compensation despite failure to achieve
stated objectives. 28 9
Regarding severance packages (like the one at issue in Disney),
"boards and compensation committees should carefully consider the
terms, triggers, and potential costs of various exit scenarios."290 The
National Association of Corporate Directors recommends that the
value of a severance package should be tied to base pay only (for
example, a simple multiple of 2x or 3x base pay).291 This package
could be reduced in cases where the CEO was fired over performance
issues or resigned. 292 Also, the compensation committee might
consider tying the size of the severance package to the length of the
executive's tenure through some type of vesting formula. 294 Apart
from these approaches, the Disney case suggests a more general lesson
for directors in the area of severance packages: do not approve the
package if the terms are unfamiliar.
V. POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Policy: Benefits Trump Concerns
To the extent that recent case law and the SEC regulatory
enforcement action have tightened scrutiny of directors' processes and
good faith, it should be noted that the merits of such an increased
threat of liability are not uncontested. Professor Langevoort asserts
that increased liability for directors "too easily misconceives the role of
the outside director and introduces a chill that redirects attention
away from the handful of things outsiders do well."295  From his
perspective, "norms rather than law ought to be the main drivers of
directorial diligence. '296  The chill effect mentioned by Professor
Langevoort is readily understandable. An increased threat of personal
liability seemingly would deter qualified candidates from taking
positions on boards of directors; however, the idea that norms can be
289. Id.
290. Id. at 28.
291. Id.
292. Id. This approach only works if the directors do not acquiesce in a no-fault termination,
as happened in Disney. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 288-89 (Del.
Ch. 2003).
294. REPORT OF NACD, supra note 287, at 28.
295. Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The
SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1159 (2003).
296. Id.
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depended upon to guarantee directors' diligence and good faith seems
to be refuted empirically by Enron and other scandals.
On the other hand, Professor Sale argues that "[s]trong
enforcement of the duty of good faith creates an incentive to prompt
fiduciaries to better behavior, even if we cannot change their
character."297  This type of judicial enforcement protects
shareholders. 298 If one considers directorial conduct like that seen in
Disney, McCall, or Abbott to be problematic, then there would seem to
be a need for judicial review that can overcome the obstacle created by
exculpatory charter provisions. In addition, the good faith analysis is
well-suited for addressing these concerns because it is flexible enough
to accommodate changing norms. The traditionally-emphasized duties
of loyalty and care may not prevent certain types of undesirable
behavior, but the duty of good faith can play an "ex ante role... in
changing the behavior and incentives of corporate fiduciaries and,
thereby changing corporate governance. '299
The chilling effect of increased directorial liability should not
be ignored, but does not pose an insurmountable obstacle. Companies
can overcome this problem and attract qualified, competent board
members by increasing director compensation. Although the company
faces higher out-of-pocket costs in increasing directors' salaries, the
company and its shareholders can expect long-term benefits that will
cover their short-term costs. Companies will end up with directors
who have an incentive to observe good process and make rational
decisions. In the long run, these companies will face fewer
management scandals and injurious, irrational business decisions.
B. Recommendations for Courts and the SEC
1. Courts
"[G]ood faith claims must be different from negligence and
gross negligence,"300 but directors may have difficulty seeing the
difference, particularly with regard to gross negligence. One is
reminded of the joke that there are three types of negligence:
negligence; damned negligence; and goddamned negligence. Joking
aside, this illustrates the point that there are few bright lines to guide
directors in this area. Courts should therefore attempt to provide
297. Sale, supra note 5, at 495.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 494.
300. Id. at 489.
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objective, ascertainable criteria in their good faith analyses that will
provide ex ante guidance for directors. One option is to establish
guideposts by drawing from case law in other, related areas. Professor
Sale considers the scienter standard for a federal Rule 10b-5 claim
instructive on the question of good faith. 301 According to Sale, federal
securities cases "provide guidance on what is simply gross negligence
and what amounts to severely reckless or egregious behavior."30 2
Under the scienter standard, "motive is relevant, but not required"30 3
and "board members are at risk when they fail to ask questions and
monitor officers and material corporate decisions."30 4 Professor Sale
advocates using scienter cases as "examples of ... the type of
egregious, subversive, or deliberately indifferent conduct" that
indicate a lack of good faith.30 5
Similarly, federal regulations and self-regulatory organization
(SRO) rules may guide directors on the procedures and norms that, if
disregarded, could support a finding of bad faith. Chief Justice Veasey
has suggested that:
[1]t is arguable-but not settled-that the issue of good faith may be measured not only
by the evolving expectations of directors in the context of Delaware common law
fiduciary duty, but also it may well be measured against the backdrop of relevant
Sarbanes-Oxley, SEC Rules and the SRO requirements, even though there may be no
express private right of action in the federal legislation.
3 0 6
In addition, "[r]ecent case law supports the suggestion of an
emerging heightened duty of good faith, which at least implicitly looks
to compliance with elements of the NYSE's definition of
independence. '30 7  Courts may therefore use federal and SRO
regulations as benchmarks for determining good faith procedural
issues.
To the extent that related case law, regulations and SRO rules
accurately reflect courts' intentions for the emerging and increasingly
significant fiduciary duty of good faith, courts should expressly adopt
301. See id. at 489-94 (noting that unintentional but flagrantly reckless actions or inactions
are breaches of good faith responsibility). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
makes it "unlawful for any person... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security..., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe."15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2005). Rule 10b-5
implements section 10(b) and forbids the use, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security," of "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud" or any other "act, practice, or course of
business" that "operates ... as a fraud or deceit." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
302. Sale, supra note 5, at 490.
303. Id. at 493.
304. Id. at 492.
305. Id. at 490.
306. Mirvis, supra note 264, at 689.
307. Id.
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these standards. Courts should take the earliest possible opportunity
to give this type of ex ante guidance in decisions, even if only in the
form of dicta. While it is impossible to define the duty of good faith
solely by reference to other, existing standards, rules and
regulations, 308  this type of guidance-when appropriate-helps
directors understand evolving expectations for their conduct.
2. The SEC
Directors' exculpatory charter provisions cannot protect them
from liability under the federal securities laws, which may allow the
SEC to sue directors even if injured shareholders cannot; however, if
SEC v. Chancellor portends a pattern of holding directors liable for
procedural failures under the federal securities laws, such liability
should not attach to simple or even gross negligence. Instead, the
SEC should pursue a framework similar to that in Disney and other
good faith cases, where courts look for directors' "knowing or
deliberate indifference"30 9 to their corporate responsibilities.
By adopting such an approach, the SEC will avoid causing the
previously-discussed "chill effect" for directors.310 While an unduly
burdensome chill effect is unlikely with regard to procedure-based
good faith review, it could be problematic if the SEC sues directors for
negligent actions that are unaccompanied by indicia of bad faith.
First, qualified and well-meaning directors would nonetheless hesitate
to accept positions if there is a risk of liability for negligent, albeit
good faith decisions. Second, liability for negligent decisions would
dampen risk-taking by acting directors. State corporate governance
law promotes good decision making by requiring directors to act with
good faith and through proper procedures, while still allowing
directors to take business risks. Although it is perhaps arguable
whether legislatures should allow exculpatory charter provisions that
protect grossly negligent directors, it is necessary and beneficial to
excuse directors for some degree of negligent conduct. As Chief
Justice Veasey said, "the new corporate culture is not intended to
stifle risk-taking or to raise undue concerns about increased liability
exposure."311
308. See Veasey, supra note 202, at 2146 (stating that "the expectations of directors are
constantly evolving").
309. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(stating that such conduct violates the duty to act faithfully and with appropriate care).
310. See discussion supra Part V.A.




A key theme in corporate governance law over the last twenty
years has been the increased use of procedural review to hold directors
personally liable. In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court
distinguished the duty of care as a standalone, effective element of the
business judgment rule. After Delaware provided directors a
statutory shield from liability for duty of care violations, procedural
review crept into Delaware and other courts' good faith analyses.
Today, the good faith issue is the courts' best tool for enforcing
directors' fiduciary duties. If it appears that a board of directors
intentionally or recklessly disregarded process in their decision
making or ignored "red flags," those directors will be held personally
liable. The SEC similarly has indicated that it will pursue directors
who are "reckless in their oversight of management and asleep at the
switch."312
Directors should not be concerned about this type of personal
liability if they adhere to basic guidelines for corporate governance.
First, the maintenance of an internal reporting system will satisfy the
directors' good faith duty under Caremark and will better enable the
directors to address "red flags" of employee misconduct. Second, an
independent compensation committee which observes predetermined
review processes and performance metrics can avoid a Disney-like
problem in the area of executive compensation. Third, if directors are
willing to take a firm stance with management and reject proposals
that are not adequately explained or do not make sense, they can
avoid participating in fraudulent activities that might expose them to
SEC sanctions.
For their part, courts and the SEC should promote consistency
and uniformity in this area. Courts can do this by adopting objective,
ascertainable criteria for evaluating directors' good faith. Whether
courts rely on scienter standards, federal regulations, SRO rules, or
something else, to the extent possible courts should identify the
"guideposts" that define good faith conduct. Likewise, the SEC can
promote consistency and uniformity by adopting the state law
approach to good faith. Rather than create varying degrees of liability
exposure for directors (and possibly cause a chill effect for qualified
directors), the SEC should pattern its enforcement actions on Disney
and other good faith cases.
Directors can rest assured that as long as they exercise good
faith, courts will not second-guess the substance of their decisions.
312. Bilodeau, supra note 13, at 51.
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Although directors cannot look to bright-line rules in the area of good
faith analysis, the standards by which courts approach the issue are
not unduly burdensome or inaccessible. Moreover, only an egregious
failure to observe these standards will create personal liability for
directors. As Chief Justice Veasey said, "[I]f a company genuinely and
in good faith has good corporate practices in place, if independent
directors have the guts to make sure those practices are followed...
then we don't dampen risk taking. I trust that at the end of the day,
the system will correct itself."313
Thomas Rivers*
313. What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?, supra note 109, at 77.
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The Unconstitutionality of "Hold
Until Cleared": Reexamining
Material Witness Detentions in the
Wake of the September 11th Dragnet
Ricardo J. Bascuas 58 Vand. L. Rev. 677 (2005)
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal
agents and prosecutors have sought and obtained the detention of
dozens of individuals as so-called "material witnesses." Though
charged with no crime, these people have been subjected to secret
weeks- or months-long incarcerations. Nearly all have been released
after the government was satisfied they had no terrorist ties. Despite
the outrage that the government's tactic has engendered, the
constitutionality of detaining material witnesses has not been
seriously questioned by litigants, courts, or legal commentators.
Laboring under the misapprehension that the incarceration of
witnesses has long been held constitutional, commentators have been
constrained merely to echo the mainstream media's complaint that
the Department of Justice is "abusing" the material witness statute.
Court challenges to such detentions have likewise been rebuffed on
the ground that such detentions have long been held constitutional.
This Article examines the federal government's unprecedented and
calculated reliance on the material witness statute in its
post-September 11th terrorism investigation. Examining the cases
cited in support of the idea that prolonged incarceration of witnesses
is constitutional, the Article shows how historical practice, Supreme
Court precedent, and the Constitution itself have been misread to
justify a tactic offensive to the Fourth Amendment. Authorities from
the earliest days of the Republic to the present make clear that,
rather than supporting the incarceration of witnesses, the practice is
at best of dubious constitutionality. The Article concludes that the
Executive's reliance on the statute for investigative detentions and
the Judiciary's credulous acquiescence in this practice pose a
potentially long-term threat to the Fourth Amendment's basic
safeguard against unreasonable seizures.

